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The Principles of Gauging
Holger Lyreyz
Ruhr-University Bochum
The aim of this paper is twofold: First, to present an examination of the principles underlying gauge eld
theories. I shall argue that there are two principles directly connected to the two well-known theorems of Emmy
Noether concerning global and local symmetries of the free matter-eld Lagrangian, in the following referred to as
\conservation principle" and \gauge principle". Since both these express nothing but certain symmetry features
of the free eld theory, they are not sucient to derive a true interaction coupling to a new gauge eld. For this
purpose it is necessary to advocate a third, truly empirical principle which may be understood as a generalization
of the equivalence principle. The second task of the paper is to deal with the ontological question concerning
the reality status of gauge potentials in the light of the proposed logical structure of gauge theories. A nonlocal
interpretation of topological eects in gauge theories and, thus, the non-reality of gauge potentials in accordance
with the generalized equivalence principle will be favoured.
1. The Gauge Argument. Textbook presentations of the logical structure of gauge eld
theories usually emphasize the importance of the gauge principle (cf. Aitchison and Hey 1982,
p. 176): Start with a certain free eld theory|take Dirac’s theory LD = ψ(iγ
µ∂µ −m)ψ for
instance|and consider local gauge transformations
ψ(x)! ψ0(x) = eiqα(x)ψ(x). (1)
To satisfy the requirement of local gauge covariance of LD the usual derivative has to be replaced
by a covariant derivative
∂µ ! Dµ = ∂µ − iqAµ. (2)
Thus, instead of a free eld theory, we obtain|in a somewhat miraculous way|a theory with
interaction
LD ! L
0
D =
ψ(iγµDµ −m)ψ = ψ(iγ
µ∂µ −m)ψ + q ψγ
µAµψ. (3)
Besides this, in usual textbook presentations reference is also made to the importance of
\Noether’s theorem": The existence of a global (i.e. rigid) k-dimensional symmetry group is
connected with the existence of k conserved currents. This general result may very well be
referred to as a principle of its own, here called the conservation principle. In the case of Dirac’s
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theory we nd that LD exhibits global gauge covariance under ψ(x)! ψ
0(x) = eiqαψ(x). The
Noether current then reads µ(x) = −q ψ(x)γµψ(x). Now, the \miracle" of the gauge principle
consists in the idea that by simply postulating local gauge covariance one is led to introduce a
new interaction potential Aµ(x) obeying Aµ(x) ! A0µ(x) = Aµ(x)− ∂µα(x). Surely, it is very
tempting to hold this suggestive interpretation, but are we really forced to?
From a mathematically more rigorous point of view, the above presentation is a bit to much of
a \miracle". Both the conservation principle as well as the gauge principle are simply concerned
with Noether’s rst and second theorem{and thus with a mere symmetry analysis of the free eld
theory. Let φi(x) be a eld variable and let i be the index of the eld components, then Noether’s
rst theorem states that the invariance of the action functional S[φ] =
R
L[φi(x), ∂µφi(x)] d4x
under the action of a k-dimensional Lie group implies the existence of k conserved currents. This
is what is usually just called \Noether’s theorem". In the language of the underlying ber bundle
structure, Noether’s rst theorem points to the importance of the bundle structure group|in
the case of the above Dirac-Maxwell theory the gauge group G = U(1). Hence, we are working
with a U(1)-principal bundle P over spacetime.1
Now let G = Aut(M) ’ Di(M)G be the automorphism group of P. Noether’s second
theorem, then, states that the invariance of the action S[φ] under G implies the existence of
k constraints known as Bianchi identities. From (2) we rst of all nd the Jacobi identity
µνρσ [Dν, [Dρ, Dσ]] = 0. With the denition Fµν = ∂µAν − ∂νAµ this is equivalent to the
Bianchi identity µνρσDνFρσ = 0. Clearly, G is innite-dimensional and consists of spacetime-
dependent (i.e. \local") group elements. In this way Noether’s second theorem gives rise to the
postulate of local gauge covariance which in turn underlies the gauge principle.
Note again that Noether’s analysis is just concerned with the symmetry conditions of a given
action functional. Hence, this does not allow for|or even force us| to interpret the Aµ-term as
a new interaction term. Both the conservation as well as the celebrated gauge principle lay claim
to certain symmetry conditions of a given eld theory|without introducing a new eld. Indeed,
how could a new physical eld be derived from a mere analysis of the symmetry structure of
some theory? How, then, are we to understand the occurence of the Aµ-term?
2. Intrinsic Gauge Theoretic Conventionalism. In recent times, a critical reading of the
gauge argument has been presented by several authors; cf. Brown (1999), Healey (2000), Teller
(2000). To easily see the issue consider a wavefunction Ψ(x) = hxjφi in the position represen-
tation jxi (with
n
jφi
o
spanning an abstract Hilbert space). Now, local gauge transformations
read jxi ! jx0i = eiα(x)jxi = U^ jxi. Such a transformation acts as changing the representation
basis of the Hilbert space and, thus, operators on that Hilbert space have to be transformed,
too. A general operator transformation looks like O^0 = U^ O^U^+. In the particular case of the
derivative operator we nd ∂µ ! Dµ = ∂µ − iqAµ(x) with the denition Aµ(x) = −∂µα(x).
We therefore clearly see that (2) has to be understood as a mere change in the position
representation expressed in terms of local gauge transformations. Hence, the covariant repre-
1A more detailed presentation of gauge theories and their bundle structure as well as a brief account of the
theory of ber bundles can be found in Guttmann and Lyre (2000).
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sentation of the derivative is as conventional as a mere coordinate representation. This feature
might very well be called an \intrinsic gauge theoretic conventionalism". The clear consequence
of this is that the celebrated gauge principle is not sucient to derive the coupling to a new
interaction-eld. No new physics enters, no new physical eld is really introduced!
3. A Missing Principle. A true gauge eld theory should be considered as a coupling
between a matter-eld and an interaction-eld theory.2 We are therefore faced with the following
problem. We have, on the one hand, equations of motion of the free matter-eld (e.g. Dirac’s
equation). Due to the gauge principle the Lagrangian reads
L0D = LD + L
(i)
inhom =
ψ(iγµ∂µ −m)ψ − 
(i)
µ A
µ (4)
with an unphysical inhomogeneity term, since the connection eld Aµ is flat (i.e. the curvature
gauge eld vanishes). On the other hand we have certain gauge eld equations (Maxwell or
Yang-Mills equations)
L0F = LF + L
(f)
inhom = −
1
4
FµνF
µν − (f)µ A
µ. (5)
Here, the inhomogeneity stems from the eld sources, i.e. certain \eld charges" q(f). In contrast
to this the vector current (i) in (4) implies a factor q(i) which is due to the phase eiq
(i)α of the
Dirac wavefunction. As will be explained in a moment we will call this the \inertial charge".
In (4), the inhomogeneity term L
(i)
inhom stems from the gauge principle. It should be clear from
our critical reading of this principle that there is no a priori possibility to identify L
(i)
inhom and
L
(f)
inhom, or q
(i) and q(f), respectively. Since both conservation principle as well as gauge principle
turned out as mere analytic statements about the symmetry structure of the free matter-eld
theory, we are in need of a truly empirical|synthetic so to speak|principle of gauging, which
allows for the identication of L
(i)
inhom and L
(f)
inhom. Fortunately, the gauge theoretic analogy to
general relativity may help to nd such a missing principle.
In fact, in standard general relativity we may also formulate a gravitational gauge principle.
The starting point for this is the free geodesic equation ddτ θ
µ
α(τ) = 0 for a tetrad reference frame
θµα. The gauge principle demands covariance under local SO(1, 3) or R(1,3) transformations.3
We get a covariant derivative
d
dτ
θµα(τ) ! rτθ
µ
α(τ) =
d
dτ
θµα(τ) + Γ
β
να
dxν(τ)
dτ
θµβ(τ). (6)
Now, the Levi-Civita connection Γµ does not necessarily represent a true gravitational potential
with a non-vanishing gravitational eld (i.e. Riemann curvature). Indeed, Γµ might occur simply
because of a peculiar choice of coordinates!
2For an elaboration of the next two sections the reader may want to refer to my companion paper Lyre (2001).
3It depends on the Noether current arising from the conservation principle how to couple the gravitational
eld. Certainly, a straightforward choice for the gauge group of general relativity is the group of Poincare
translations R(1,3) which implies the conservation of energy-matter. Moreover, this is a reasonable choice since
local translations are equivalent to dieomorphisms.
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The \true" gravitational eld with non-vanishing Riemann curvature is of course governed
by the Einstein eld equations Rµν −
1
2 R gµν = −κ Tµν . The r.h.s. represents the eld source,
i.e. gravitational mass m(g) which is encoded in the energy-momentum tensor Tµν . In contrast
to this, a freely moving observer in spacetime (a reference frame represented by a tetrad in the
geodesic equation) will be assigned an inertial mass m(i). As the reader might guess already, in
general relativity the conceptual problem of linking equations of motion and eld equations is
solved on the basis of the equivalence principle. The cruicial identication
m(i) = m(g) (7)
becomes indeed the one and decisive empirical input to any geometric theory of gravitation.
There is no a priori reason to identify inertial and gravitational mass and, hence, the equivalence
principle has to be vindicated by the experimental fact that dierent materials do have the same
free fall behaviour. In this way, the universality of the gravitational coupling constitutes a deep
fundamental insight.
4. The Generalized Equivalence Principle. We may now return to our problem of nding
the missing empirical principle in gauge eld theories. The relativistic equivalence principle
implies the possibility of a non-flat connection and, hence, a non-vanishing gravitational eld.
Due to the close analogy between general relativity and standard quantum gauge eld theories
we may very well generalize the idea of the equivalence principle. Indeed, the equivalence of
inertial and eld charges
q(i) = q(f) (8)
solves our problem and allows for a true coupling term Lcoup = L
(i)
inhom = L
(f)
inhom. Thus,
equations of motion and eld equations belong to one combined framework and we obtain the
full Lagrangian of a gauge eld theory representing|quite generally|the coupling between
matter-eld and interaction-eld
LGFT = LD + Lcoup + LF . (9)
We may give the following geometric formulation of the generalized equivalence principle:
GEP: It is always possible to perform a local gauge transfomation such that, locally
(i.e. at a point), the gauge eld vanishes.
In this way, GEP implies a non-flat connection, i.e. a gauge potential which is irrevocably
connected with the occurrence of an interacting gauge eld originating in the eld charges and
obeying its own dynamics. Equation (8) turns out as a direct consequence of this, for if we regard
the connection as non-flat, the eld must have its sources in certain eld charges. Moreover,
GEP includes the interaction-free theory as a local limiting case.
The reader may wonder whether we have simply replaced one miracle by another. However,
the equivalence (8) is far from trivial. There is|quite analogous to (7)|no a priori reason
to identify inertial and eld charges. Let us assume for a moment q
(f)
q(i)
6= 1. This means that
dierent types of particles of equal electric charge would couple dierently to the electromagnetic
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eld. We should expect a dierence in the coupling of electrons and muons or d-quarks and
s-quarks|to give but two examples|and should therefore write down dierent Dirac equations
(iγµ∂µ −m)ψe
iq(i)α = cp q
(f) γµAµ ψe
iq(i)α (10)
for dierent types of particles with the same q(f) but a particle-type dependent factor cp. This is
clearly not what we observe. In fact, GEP predicts a whole variety of null-experiments (as does
its relativistic counterpart). The equivalence (8) indicates the empirically known universality
of the gauge eld coupling, turning GEP into the one and decisive physical principle of gauge
theories.
The three principles of gauging We may summarize our considerations so far. It will be
helpful to draw the following distinction of types of ber bundles occuring in gauge theories:
We may have trivial bundles4 with flat and non-flat connections. Let us call them type 1 and
type 2 bundles. As long as we are concerned with trivial bundles, the notion of a ber bundle
is in a way superfluous (since we may simply use a direct product). For non-trivial bundles,
however, the ber bundle framework becomes indispensible. Let us indicate non-trivial bundles
as type 3 bundles. Since we may again distinguish between flat and non-flat connections, we
may accordingly call them type 3a and type 3b bundles.
I shall rewiew the three proposed principles of gauging:
Conservation principle. Based on Noether’s rst theorem it connects the global (i.e. rigid)
symmetry of a free eld theory with the existence of certain conserved quantities. As an
analytic statement of the symmetry structure of the theory it does not contain any new
physical information.
Gauge principle. Based on Noether’s second theorem it connects the local (i.e. spacetime-
dependent) symmetry of a free eld theory with the suggested structure of the coupling
to an interaction-eld. It is tempting to take the suggested coupling already for granted,
however, the gauge principle only implies flat connections and, hence, no non-vanishing
interaction elds. In other words, the gauge principle does not allow for a transition from
type 1 to type 2 bundles (or type 3a to 3b, respectively). As a mere analytic statement of
the symmetry structure of the theory it also does not contain new empirical information.
Equivalence principle. This is a true empirical principle which lays claim for the universality
of the gauge eld coupling due to the identication q(i) = q(f). This manifests the coupling
of matter-elds and interaction-elds and allows to combine equations of motion and eld
equations into one framework. The equivalence principle implies the existence of non-flat
connections and therefore non-vanishing interaction-elds. It is a synthetic statement of
the empirical basis of gauge eld theories.
A schematic representation is given in gure 1.
4Trivial bundles allow for global sections, they globally look like direct products spaces. In contrast to this,
non-trivial bundles only locally look like a direct product.
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Mills (1989), Fig. 1:
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Figure 1: In his 1989 review article, Robert Mills gave a graphical
representation of what he calls the \logical pattern of a gauge theory".
The triangular structure of his pattern, on the left hand side, also
illustrates our understanding of the principles of gauging in terms of
the right hand side gure.
6. The Reality of Gauge Potentials. \Only gauge-independent quantities are observable."
This truism is supported by our critical remarks on the intrinsic gauge theoretic conventionalism
of local symmetries. It is also in accordance with GEP as an argument in favour of non-flat
connections, i.e. non-vanishing gauge-independent eld strengths. Therefore, GEP lays claim
for not considering gauge potentials as physically real entities. Clearly, this is true for type 2
and type 3b bundles which are concerned with non-flat connections. However bundles of type 3a
seem to allow for physical|viz. topological|eects which have their origin in flat connections
(type 1 is just a trivial case). Does this contradict GEP’s point of view of not considering gauge
potentials as physically real?
Usually physicists think along these lines. They do consider gauge potentials as real entities
because of topological eects in eld theories. This view is supported by some kind of a common-
sense indispensability argument: First, gauge potentials|and matter-elds|are the genuine
objects in the ber bundle formulation of gauge theories. They are clearly indespensible for
the mathematical formulation (as being the connection forms). Also, they are indespensible
for the physical formulation of quantum eld theories, since both the coupling structure (vertex
structure) as well as the quantization procedure itself are represented on the level of potentials
and not the eld strengths. How, then, are we to do physics without potentials?
As Michael Redhead (2000) has pointed out, the situation is even worse, since no matter
wether we consider potentials real or not, we will always face ontological problems. Quite gener-
ally, such problems seem to arise in theories with a certain mathematical surplus structure. Here
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Figure 2: Schematic experimental conguration of the AB eect.
we have a mathematical structure M 0 which is larger than the structure M needed for a direct
correspondence (i.e. isomorphism) to the observable physical structure P . The complement of
M in M 0 might be called surplus structure. Gauge potentials are an example of surplus structure
in gauge theories. Now, \Redhead’s dilemma" looks like the following: On the one hand the
reality of gauge-dependent potentials implies a mystic influence from non-observable physical
beables to observable ones. This, in fact, is a version of the famous hole argument|and this
rst horn of the dilemma leaves us with indeterminism.5 The second horn is that once we assert
the non-reality of gauge potentials, this implies a \Platonist" role for mathematical elements to
influence physical beables.
To get along with Redhead’s dilemma we shall take a closer look to the well-known Aharonov-
Bohm eect, which is indeed the paradigm case of type 3a bundles|and, hence, topological
eects. Due to Aharonov and Bohm (1959) a shift in the interference pattern of the electron
wave function surrounding a solenoid (on paths P1 and P2) is observed, even though the electron
is shielded from the region of the magnetic eld (see gure 2). Since only the vector potential
has a non-vanishing contribution outside the solenoid, the AB eect is usually understood as
showing the physical signicance of gauge potentials.
As can be seen from the experimental conguration, the existence of the AB eect depends
crucially on the fact that the conguration space of the electron is not simply-connected. Since
the electron is shielded from the solenoid, this space has essentially the toplogy of a circle (as
represented by any closed loop surrounding the solenoid, such as paths P1 and P2, for instance).
Now, as Yang (1974) has rst pointed out, the AB eect may be described solely in terms of
the Dirac phase factor
α =
I
C
Aµ dx
µ. (11)
This integral lives in the space of loops and is called a holonomy. Clearly, holonomies are
gauge-independent quantities and therefore appropriate candidates of observable entities.
So far, this does not solve our problem since we are still working with an integral which
5For a discussion of the bundle space hole argument see Lyre (1999).
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depends on the gauge potential (in a gauge-independent manner, though). However, due to
Stokes’ theorem I
C
Aµ dx
µ =
Z
S
Fµν ds
µν , (12)
we might very well describe the AB eect as a nonlocal eect in terms of the magnetic eld
strength alone. In fact, Stokes’ formula allows to shift back and forth between the potential
and the eld strength interpretation. Presented this way, the AB eect turns out as a nice
case study of theory underdetermination by empirical evidence. Physicists tend to favour the
potential interpretation since it apparently allows for a local interaction account. This, however,
leaves Redhead’s dilemma unsolved.
A second, even stronger worry against the physicist’s common line of simply accepting the re-
ality of gauge potentials, is the fact that, in any case, due to the topological origin of Dirac’s phase
factor, we will never completely get rid of a certain kind of non-locality|or non-separability
(Healey 1997). Topological eects unavoidably lead, in one way or the other, to a nonlocal
account. It is therefore impossible to give a purely local description of the interference shift,
neither within the eld nor the potential interpretation. We may gladly accept the eld inter-
pretation and, also, should consider holonomies as physically real. This option has the clear
advantage of avoiding Redhead’s dilemma, since no surplus structure arises.
7. Conclusion. Even for the description of toplogical eects in type 3a bundles, the reality of
gauge potentials is not enforced. We may very well represent the physically signicant structures
in an ontological universe consisting of matter-elds, gauge eld strengths and holonomies. The
price we pay is to accept a certain type of nonlocality in gauge theories|which seemingly diers
from quantum nonlocalities such as EPR correlations due to its manifest topological origin, but
seems unavoidable anyhow in both the potential and the eld strength account.
Now, since holonomies may be represented in terms of gauge eld strengths (because of
Stoke’s formula), we are in perfect agreement with GEP as an argument against the signicance
of flat connections. Indeed, the three proposed principles of gauging prove to be a consistent
framework of the main conceptual structure of gauge eld theories. Maybe, therefore, the idea
of a generalized equivalence principle helps to clarify the issue of the logical gauge theoretic
pattern. Nevertheless, a couple of deep philosophical puzzles remain to be solved|last but not
least the very idea of gauging itself, which may heavily lean on a sucient account of locality
and nonlocality in physics. Thus, the issue of gauge theories should become much more the
focus of philosophers of science than it was before. Personally, I couldn’t agree more to how
Michael Redhead (2001) has recently put it: \The gauge principle is generally regarded as the
most fundamental cornerstone of modern theoretical physics. In my view its elucidation is the
most pressing problem in current philosophy of physics."
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